I am in a unique situation, having been involved in 2 major US public health events resulting from novel swineorigin influenza viruses. In 1976, I was Director of the Center for Disease Control (CDC, the name of the agency at the time) when a new influenza virus, characterized as an influenza A(H1N1) swine virus, was isolated from military recruits at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Subsequently, I led the CDC through the US response to this outbreak, which culminated in the decision to implement the swine flu vaccination program during which 45 million people were vaccinated over 10 weeks. The program was stopped after cases of Guillain-Barré Syndrome were identified following vaccination and when no spread of the virus occurred beyond Fort Dix. In 2009, as another new swine H1N1 virus was first identified and emergency response began, I was asked to be an advisor to the CDC Director in order that I might provide historical context to the novel H1N1 swine-origin outbreak and response. In this latter capacity, I have been able to observe and participate in discussions resulting in decisionmaking for the CDC's national response to this public health emergency as an unpaid consultant. This paper is a personal commentary on the similarities and dissimilarities of the 2 episodes.
Rather than retell the history of the 1976 swine influenza outbreak and response, I intend to look at what I feel are important differences between the 2 situations and speculate as to whether the lessons learned as a result of 1976, and other emergency responses, influenced the response in 2009-2010. There have been many publications analyzing what was done wrong in 1976. For a recent review of lessons learned, the paper by Sencer and Millar [1] is recommended.
LESSON 1: EXPECT THE UNEXPECTED

1976
In 1976, it was thought that an influenza pandemic would originate in the Southern Hemisphere or Southeast Asia. Instead, cases originated and occurred in a localized outbreak only in the United States that did not culminate in a pandemic.
There was no known association between influenza vaccination and Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS) before vaccine-associated GBS cases were detected by surveillance. Similar swine flu vaccines had been used safely in the military for decades.
An outbreak of influenza-like illness in August 1976 among elderly men attending a convention of the American Legion in Philadelphia was originally thought to be caused by 1976 swine flu. It was eventually determined to be the first identified outbreak of Legionnaire's disease, but the media interpreted the event as an attempt by the government to stimulate the vaccination program [2] .
The insurance industry refused to provide insurance to vaccine producers, and the manufacturers would not provide vaccine unless the government passed legislation to indemnify them against claims of adverse reactions. The public interpreted this to indicate that there was something wrong with the vaccine, and every coincident health event was attributed to the vaccine.
One of the vaccine manufacturers used an older swine influenza virus to make the vaccine seed strain (not the Fort Dix strain) to produce vaccine, which would not have provided optimal protection against the Fort Dix Although the cost of the vaccination program was estimated to be $137 million, newspapers mischaracterized the cost as $1.9 billion because the vaccination appropriation was included as part of a supplemental appropriation for the Department of Labor. The misconception prevailed throughout the vaccination campaign.
2009
Pandemic planning scenarios before 2009 assumed the next pandemic would originate in southeast Asia and likely result from an avian H5N1 influenza virus. Laboratory preparedness activities and vaccine trials also assumed the virus would be H5N1. Instead the 2009 pandemic began in the Western Hemisphere, was H1N1, and of swine origin.
During pandemic planning, it was assumed the next pandemic would be associated with severe illness. Planning for instituting community mitigation strategies assumed that there would be high case-fatality rates, and therefore society would tolerate disruptive strategies such as school closure. The 2009 H1N1 virus caused less severe illness than planned for, and mitigation strategies, such as school closure and keeping persons out of work or school for the duration of viral shedding, were not well tolerated.
It was assumed that all age groups would be affected by a pandemic strain of influenza. However, the highest attack rates in 2009 were in children, and many older adults were immune.
LESSON 2: LET SCIENTISTS COMMUNICATE, NOT POLITICIANS
1976
The President convened a highly visible meeting including Albert Sabin, Jonas Salk, and representatives of professional groups to decide if there should be a vaccination program. The press event announcing the decision to proceed with the vaccination program was interpreted to be a political event rather than a scientific process.
This was also the only press conference during the entire 10-month-long vaccination program, and press contacts occurred through the Assistant Secretary for Health's Office. The president himself was vaccinated on television, further heightening perceptions that this was a politicized effort.
Cessation of the program after cases of GBS were identified was handled with a press release, not a press conference. There was no concerted effort to counter misinformation in the press, leading to accusations of secrecy.
2009
The CDC was designated and acknowledged as the lead agency and primary spokesperson for the pandemic response, and the message was reinforced at all levels of government that this would be a science-led and science-driven response. The CDC maintained consistent and proactive communications practices throughout the response. The CDC's consistent communications practices, resulting from close coordination between program and communications, included frequent updates to media and the public with consistent use of a body of core spokespersons, daily information outreach to partners, and rapid establishment and daily maintenance of extensive web content related to the emergency response. These actions resulted in both the practice and the perception of transparency.
In addition, the CDC attained credibility by its consistent messaging conveying uncertainty in the face of a rapidly evolving situation and acknowledgement that ''these are the facts today, they may change tomorrow.''
LESSON 3: SURVEILLANCE IS VITAL
1976
There were no desktop or laptop computers and no cell phones. And yet current surveillance data were obtained by reports from others, primarily State Health Departments. This information was sensitive enough to describe the outbreak at Fort Dix, maintain information on influenza, primarily A Victoria H3N2, was able to track vaccine distribution and usage, and detect adverse reactions, GBS in particular.
2009
Computers and hand-held devices are ubiquitous, not luxuries. And yet the CDC remains dependent on surveillance data from others, primarily State Health Departments but increasingly on other sources, such as the Emerging Infections Program. In 2009, surveillance was much more complicated than in 1976 because the pandemic strain was widespread and the analysis of the data was exemplary. But it is not real-time data and will remain such until a national uniform automated data system exists.
Vaccine usage data in 2009 have depended on telephone surveys because of the multiplicity of providers receiving vaccine directly from a warehouse. Is the information on uptake of vaccine any better than in 1976 when weekly counts based on signed consent forms were available? This is not to belittle the surveillance of 2009, which was magnificent, but rather to be cautionary of expecting more realtime information until there are fundamental changes in how data are collected and reported.
LESSON 4: PLANNING IS IMPORTANT BUT MUST BE FLEXIBLE
1976
There was no existing vaccination plan, and a plan of operations had to be rapidly developed. Although rapidly developed, the vaccination plan was effective in getting millions vaccinated and was based on existing public health programs-federal purchase and distribution of vaccine, and grants to states to develop and implement immunization programs. Surveillance programs that were instituted identified spurious reports of disease due to laboratory inaccuracies, maintained current information on vaccine usage, and identified GBS.
2009
There had been extensive planning, but it was based on a worst case scenario with a high level of severity, and assuming some cushion of time from pandemic strain recognition to widespread dissemination in the United States. The plan included the development of a ''command structure'' that would be put into place immediately. This allowed the flexibility to revise plans once surveillance and epidemiologic studies indicated the severity was less than feared.
LESSON 5: DECISION MAKING IS RISKY
1976
The CDC and its Advisory committee on Immunization Practices recommended that rather than stockpile vaccine that we stockpile circulating antibodies (administer the vaccine) given concerns that if the United States waited for additional transmission to be documented, the virus would spread faster than vaccine could be distributed and administered. The rapid spread of the A/Victoria H3N2 seasonal influenza virus strain, which spread across the United States within 6 weeks of its initial detection in Oregon in 1975-1976, was used as evidence of the need for early vaccination.
Although this was (in my opinion) the correct approach, the constant and uncontested barrage of criticism in the press and the occurrence of vaccine-associated GBS, turned this into a politically damaging episode, especially when a pandemic did not materialize.
2009
The CDC has handled the response to the pandemic with great scientific skill and has navigated the shoals of the bureaucracy adroitly. The CDC engaged and educated the media during the planning stage by including them in pandemic exercises and during the response in ''boot camps,'' where members of the media were invited to the CDC for lectures and training. The current administration has supported the CDC's leadership role in this public health response and, while engaged and supportive, has not politicized the issue.
LESSON 6: SUPPORT OF THE RESPONSE
1976
The organizational ethic at the CDC was that it functioned as a single entity, not a conglomerate of self sustained ''silos.'' When the decision was made that the immunization program was the agency priority, all segments willingly contributed person power to the effort. This allowed for a unified workforce and command structure.
2009
The CDC is now a much more loosely knit skein of categorical programs (Centers within the agency). Although over 1500 people from throughout the CDC supported the response, there was never an absolute mandate from leadership that influenza was the most important activity of the agency and all were to contribute, recognizing that some Center priorities might not be met. Therefore, the leadership of the H1N1 response activity was not as able to ''requisition'' resources as had been the case in 1976.
Summary
In 1963, the definition of surveillance by Langmuir was the orderly collection of information, central analysis of that information, and return of the assembled information to the providers of the information [3] . However, that definition does not highlight the importance of providing information to the public as well. In the 21st century, communication staff must be completely involved with all aspects of the response. The success of any public health program is tied to the quality of the information presented to the public. The CDC's communications practices during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and the close coordination that occurred between program and communications is a perfect example of this relationship. It is probably in large part responsible for the fact that, despite delayed arrival of large supplies of vaccine, 80 million people in the United States chose to get vaccinated against 2009 H1N1. Perhaps the primary lesson learned from this pandemic will be that while decision-making is always risky, that risk can be minimized through effective communications.
Whether the avoidance of many of the pitfalls of 1976 is as a result of the lessons learned or has been part of the evolution of public health practice is hard to say. The management of the pandemic has been exemplary. This is not to say there have been no problems: school officials should have been involved early, more attention should have been given to assuring that healthcare providers knew as much or more than the public, some important studies have not yet been published, and many of the guidances contained too much information and caveats, such that public health actions the CDC was recommending became lost in the details.
But on balance, the response has been a success and so far, the ultimate test of management has been met: no one has been fired.
